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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:11~ STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
]AR'[ T. COLES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19376 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
An appeal from a conviction of Driving Under the 
!cfluence, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Second Circuit Court 
in and for Rich County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ted S. 
0 erry, Judge presiding; said conviction having been appealed 
:o and affirmed by the First Judicial District Court in and for 
01ch County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Gary T. Coles, appeals from a verdict 
-,[ 'JUllty in a criminal proceeding in which he was charged with 
"• ~ffense of Driving Under the Influence, a Class B Misdemeanor, 
'1,,1at1on of Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44 (1953 as amended), 
' '11<0 '•econd Circuit Court in and for Rich County, State of 
'". ' 1,, H<>norab 1 e Ted s. Perry, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried in a non-jury trial on August 
"'8c, in the Second Circuit Court and was found guilty of 
the offense of Driving Under the Influence, and sPntenced on 
September 28, 1982, to serve sixty days in the Rich rnunt~ 
and pay a fine of Two Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars ($2991. Thar 
conviction was appealed to and affirmed by the First Judicial 
District Court in and for Rich County, State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Judgment and convict 1 ~n 
rendered against him reversed and have the case remanded to t~ 
Second Circuit Court in and for Rich County for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 13, 1982, the appellant, Gary T. Coles, was 
arraigned in the Second Circuit Court in Rich County, Utah. 1 
At that hearing he requested the opportunity to retain and con-
sult with counsel. 2 The Court gave him time to do that and 
ordered him to appear in court on July 27, 1982. 3 On that date 
the appellant appeared in court, entered a plea of not guilty 
and informed the Court that he would be represented by Mr. Ron 
Yengich from Salt Lake City, Utah. 4 The Court informed th~ 
appellant that his trial was scheduled for August 24, i 982, at 
9:30 a.m., and if he desired a jury a written demand would haw 
to be filed prior to that date. 5 
1. See: 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. See: 
5. Ibid. 
6. See: 
6 
On August 24, 1982, the case '"as called for trial. 
Transcript of Proceedings held on July 13, l'J8_ · 
Transcript of Proceedings held on July 27, 1982. 
Transcript of Proceedings held on August 24, 1982 
a-
P· 3. 
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•ner th"' defendant nor his counsel of record were present. 7 
,,":~r, pursuant to a filing of a demand for a Jury trial a 
1en1rP was present, but was dismissed by the Court. 8 The 
crt ordered that the trial proceed without the defendant being 
u 
, •sent. - A highway patrol trooper testified that he stopped 
-·,e ctefendant' s automobile for a traffic violation: speeding. lO 
"" trooper observed that the defendant had glassy, bloodshot 
-·,,es, staggered or wobbled as he walked and had an odor of 
;1,:oholic beverages upon him. 
11 
Field tests were requested, 
·:,c1d·, the trooper felt that the defendant did not pass, 12 and 
, breathalyzer test was administered. 13 Testimony was also ad-
":1tted that indicated that the breathalyzer machine was working 
properly before and after the administration of the test in 
question, 14 and a sample taken from the batch of ampules used 
the test in question had the.proper chemicals in it.
15 
The defendant-appellant appeared at sentencing with 
·;r. Yengich' s law partner. 16 At that time the Court was informed 
=~t =01msel had instructed the defendant not to appear for trial 
:
0 =ause a jury demand had been filed which would put the case 
Transcript of Proceedings held. on August 24, 1982 at 
p. 3. 
at p. 3. 
at p. 3. 
at p. 5. 
at p. 7 
at pp. 7-9. 
at pp. 11-15. 
at pp. 17-18. 
:it pp. 17-18. 
Transcript of Proceedings held on September 28, 1982, 
,:ii. p. 2. 
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on a different calendar. Affidavits were submitted i·h 
indicated that Mr. Yengich was not aware that a iury •r·a. 
be held on the same day as a bench trial and he was not so Lr -
formed by the Court and that Mr. Yengich's secretary made 
attempts to telephone the court clerk to confirm a tria" ja·~ 
and her calls were not returned. 18 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY 
ABSENT HIMSELF FROM TRIAL AFTER RECEIVING 
NOTICE. THUS, THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY 
TRYING HIM IN HIS ABSENCE IN VIOLATION OF 
HIS RIGHT TO DEFEND HIMSELF IN PERSON. 
The trial in this case was held in the absence of tM 
defendant. Such a procedure violated the defendant-appell~nt 
right to confrontation of witnesses and due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Uni te·c 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Const1tJt~ 
of Utah. The applicable part of Article I, Section 12 provides 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right '.:c 
appear and defend in person and by counsel." 19 The except:.cr,. 
to the right are described in both the case law and by statute, 
The statutory exceptions are described in Utah Code Annnta·~d 
§77-35-17(a) (1953 as amended!. It states: 
17. 
18. 
19. 
In all cases -+::he def~ndant shal 1 nave t-hi? ri_i1~­
to appear and defend in person and oy ~ounsei. 
defendant shall be personally present at the ~r 
See Transcript of Proceedings held on 3eptember ~s 
at pp. 2-4. 
Ibid, at p. 3. 
Utah Code Annotated ~7-.-l-~)(111,3 \'•~~ -1S 1rr.ended 
vides the same protec~1on. 
~, r ~,-
~1•h the following exceptions: 
! lJ In prosecutions of misdemeanors and in-
fractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial 
in his absence; 
( 2) In prosecutions for offenses not punish-
Jrde by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from 
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and 
d •rerd1ct or Judgment entered therein shall have the 
same effect as if the defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant 
from trial for good cause shown which may include 
t.wnu l tuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court 
mav require the personal attendance of the defendant 
"t trial. [Emphasis added.] 
1s important to note that the first portion of this 
:•tute is mandatory in requiring the attendance of the defen-
'"r.~ In this case there was no written consent to hold the 
.ai 1n the jefendant-appellant's absence . Nor was it the sit-
.. ar;cn ·:1here the defendant appeared and the Court ordered him 
•e,rc.ved fr·om the courtroom because of his behavior . The only 
. ~µ11cable exception is that he voluntarily absented himself 
:'•er •ece1 •1ing notice of the trial date. 
faking the notice first, there is no question that 
~~~ellant ~as 1nformed that his trial date was to be August 
However, there is also no question that his attar-
1 ,s1 r •1ct ed him that trial vwuld not be held on that date, 
··"·' apf>el lant '«1ould be notified by his attorney of when the 
1d"·~ ·,.1ould be. Such reliance is in accordance with 
•. ~~ of Criminal Procedure. Rule 3, Utah Code Anno-
·"\(hi i 1953 as amended), provides: 
~henever service is required to be made upon a 
part; represented bv an attorney, the service shall 
be made upcn the attorney, unless service upon the 
- 3 -
party himself is ordered by the court. ServicP 
upon the attorney or party shall be made in the 
manner provided in civil actions. 
At the arraignment the Circuit Court Judge did not 
enter an order requiring that the defendant-appellant be persw 
ally notified of any change in the trial date or be personall·, 
served with any motions. At that hearing the Court was provld~c 
with the name of the appellant's attorney. However, in obvious 
violation of this rule, a notice of the trial date was not pro-
vided to Mr. Yengich. 20 Since the appellant was acting on the 
advice of counsel and additionally, counsel was not properly 
notified of the trial date, the State has not shown that the 
appellant was given notice of the trial date. Consequently, 
it was improper to try the appellant in his absence. 
Under the circumstances of this case there is also 
no showing that the appellant's absence from trial was voluntar:r. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "voluntary" as follows: 
Unconstrained by interference; unimpelled by 
another's influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself. 
Done by design or intention, purpose, intended. Prc·-
ceeding from the free and unrestrained will of the 
person. Produced in or by an act of choice. Result· 
ing from choosing. The word, especially in statutes, 
often implies knowledge of essential facts. 
In one case the Supreme Court of Utah has held that 
the defendant did voluntarily absent himself from the trial. 
State v. Myers, 29 Ut.2d 254, 508 P.2d 41 (1973). In t:hat 
the defendant was charged with forgery. The State presenlea 
20. See Affidavit of Counsel. 
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., idPnce on the first day of trial, at which the defendant 
,r1 ,-:1ttendance, The defendant requested a six-day continuance 
1"·1nc.J wi.tnesses into Utah from out-of-state. The trial court 
1
:ari:ed the motion~ On the day that the trial was to recommence 
defendant's attorney was present, but neither the defendant 
"·' his w1 tness appeared. The Court denied a motion by the de-
:e•,se for a mistrial and ordered defense counsel to proceed. 
·oe Supreme Court of Utah held that the defendant did have a 
nght to be present for trial, but what occurred in that case 
~s that he was attempting to gain an advantage in a new trial 
~ refusing to appear. The holding in that case is consistent 
.11th the definition of voluntary, i.e., that an act be done on 
one's own volition with a design or motive underlying it. 
In this case the appellant had nothing to gain by 
f a1 l rng to appear. At best a warrant would be issued for his 
errest, and the worst, in fact, occurred: a trial being held 
·.-1t1ere he was not present to defend himself. Likewise, the 
•ecord shows that the failure to appear was not an act done by 
c0 appellant on his own volition. His attorney had instructed 
""' that he need not appear on the date he was told that his 
••l would be held. Consequently, there is no showing that 
1µpellAnt's absence at trial was voluntary, and holding the 
in li1s absence violated his rights as guaranteed by the 
•1,. 1 ttut1on of the United states and the State of Utah. 
There is no question that holding the trial in the 
''··sence of the defendant-appellant and his counsel resulted in 
·,,_ •l•J1,~e requiring reversal of the conviction and judgment. 
- 7 -
In the first place, because neither the defendant nor h1s 
counsel were present the trial court dismissed the Jury. '"' 
8-24-82, p. 3.) Thus, the State needed only to convince one 
rather than four persons of the defendant-appellant's guilt. 
More importantly, the appellant was precluded from presenting 
a defense, both through the presentation of evidence and by 
cross examination of the State's witnesses. In Pointer v. 
.. 
Texas, 320 U.S. 400 (1965), the Supreme Court stated, 
probably no one, certainly no one experienced in the trial of 
lawsuits, would deny the value of cross examination in expos1M 
falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a crimina: 
case." 320 U.S. at 404. Cross examination of the arresting 
officer reasonably may have shown that the appellant's actions 
were not the result of intoxication or that certain other 
actions of the appellant were inconsistent with intoxication. 
Likewise, cross examination of the breathalyzer maintenance 
officer could reasonably have shown malfunctions or problems 
with that machine, thus raising doubts as to the reliability 
of the breathalyzer results. 
Consequently, there are reasons to believe that had 
the appellant or counsel been present at trial the result vwuii 
have been different. The error here cannot be said to be har 
less beyond a reasonable doubt; thus requiring reversal of "h'' 
judgment and conviction and an order for a new trial. v~!1°,:rnan 
v. California 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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POINT II 
THF. TRIAL IN ABSENTIA DENIED THE APPELLANT 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
::ai-es provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
3,·c11sed shal 1 enjoy the right . to have the assistance of 
.Junsc"! for his defense." That portion of the Sixth Amendment 
11ac: made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of 
:ne F')urteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
:?031. Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah pro-
11des a similar protection. With respect to misdemeanor pro-
.~utions the Supreme Court of the United States has required 
rnat counsel be appointed where a misdemeanor will result in 
;ctual imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); 
Aqersinger v. Hamlin, 407 u.s: 25 (1972). The protection 
;fforded by the Utah statutes is even broader. Utah Code 
'Fnotated §77-32-1 ( 1953 as amended) requires appointment of 
:11msel whenever a defendant "faces the possibi 1 i ty of the de-
.cr1'1ation of his liberty or other serious criminal sanction." 
-his case a sixty day Jail sentence was imposed. (Tr. 9-28-
c. ~-I Clearly, the defendant-appellant was entitled to 
r~prPsented by counsel at his trial, and he had informed the 
.d h 1 s in1 ti al appearance not only that he desired to have 
"'l, but also that he had in fact retained counsel. (Tr. 
31ncP the appellant was entitled to effective assist-
.- >f "ltmsel. the question arises if there was State action 
- 9 -
involved in convicting him in the absence of his retained 
counsel. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), this 
issue was addressed. The court there reasoned that in a cri~ 
nal trial the State initiates the proceeding and that is an 
action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The court went on to state with respect to ineffective 
retained counsel, "When a state obtains a criminal conviction 
through such a trial, it is the state that unconstitutionally 
deprives the defendant of his liberty." 446 U.S. 343. 
Counsel's failure to appear at trial and the Court's 
proceeding in his absence denied the appellant of his right to 
counsel. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the court 
discussed some of the functions an attorney plays in a crimi-
nal trial, stating: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, 
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right 
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skilLin 
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is 
incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is un-
familiar with the rules of evidence. Left without 
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evi-
dence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or other-
wise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and M10'c:-
ledqe adequately to prepare his defense, even thougl 
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding nd 11 ' 1 
of counsel at every step in the proceedings ag,11n;r 
him. Without it, though he be not gui 1 ty, he f acP 
the danger of conviction because he does not knovi 
to establish his innocence. 
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the Supreme Coen· 
- 10 -
1 ~hat defendants with conflicting interests who were repre-
r~rl by a single attorney were denied their right to effect-
assistance of counsel . Other functions that counsel pro-
.ies ,,,ere described. There the court noted that a denial of 
,,he r'ight to effective assistance of counsel affects plea 
:ieg0 t1ations, the admission of evidence and arguments at sen-
:2nc1ng. In that case the court held that once a denial of the 
, 1ght to counsel has been demonstrated there is no need to show 
or";ud1ce and a new trial is automatic. This was because when 
, defendant is denied his right to counsel it usually involves 
actions not taken. Assessing the impact on the trial of actions 
:1ot taken by counsel is a virtual impossibility. 
In this case counsel did not even appear at trial. 
,:onsequently, none of the normal functions of counsel at trial 
::ere undertaken by anybody. There can be no question that the 
cppellant was denied his right to effective assistance of 
:ounsel at trial. Consequently, reversal of the judgment and 
conv1ct1on are automatic and a new trial should be ordered. 
holJ oway v. Arkansas, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was denied his constitutional rights 
~ cc or:,sent at trial and to counsel. The trial court conse-
r i '.1 romm1 tted error by holding the trial in the absence of 
'' the appellant and his attorney. With a denial of the right 
'""inse 1, no prejudice need be shown to obtain a new trial. 
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